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I. INTRODUCTION

The term self-determination still teeters on the borders of evolving
legal precept, expression of political will, and universal human aspiration.
The concept never quite settles down into a black letter law
pronouncement or a clearly understood political dynamic. Nor does it find
full expression by being regarded merely as the rallying cry of the
dispossessed. It is this very fact of the amorphous and evolving nature of
the concept of self-determination that makes it both fascinating and
frustrating.
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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEANING OF SELFDETERMINATION

The term self-detennination has undergone considerable historical
transfiguration since it was first launched on the international arena by
President Woodrow Wilson. After World War I, when the victorious
powers were busy redrawing state boundaries, self-determination became
the touchstone for the creation of new states that arose out of the rubble of
the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. President Wilson stated:
"National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated
and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will
henceforth ignore at their peril."' There is a certain irony to this statement
as that was definitely the era of a few well-placed men disappearing into
smoke-filled rooms with old maps and emerging with newly drawn borders
although there were some plebiscites among sections of the male
population of certain areas that were supposed to guide the line drawing.
The Covenant of the League of Nations did not mention selfdetermination though the Mandate System was supposed to work towards
the development of colonial peoples. A series of treaties were signed after
World War I for the protection of minorities within certain defeated states.
Neither of these regimes, the Mandate system or the minority treaties,
however, offered political participation as a right to the governed group.
The right to separation from the larger state was firmly rejected by the
Commission of Jurists in its ruling on the status of the Aaland Islands in
1920: "Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national
groups, as such, to separate themselves from the State of which they form
part by the simple expression of a wish, anymore than it recognizes the
2
right of other States to claim such a separation."
III. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND SELF-DETERMINATION
The United Nations Charter mentions self-determination twice.
Article 1(2) mentions as one of the Purposes of the United Nations: "To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . ." Article 55 notes
that "stability and well-being . . . are necessary for peaceful and friendly

relations among nations [which should be] based on respect for the
1.
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. . . ." Clearly,
the United Nations system was based on the idea of equality of existing
sovereign states and, to a lesser extent, on moving dependent states
towards independence.
IV. DECOLONIZATION
The rapidly increasing demands for an end to colonialism were the
occasion for raising self-determination to a right and for linking the right
to political participation in governance. In 1960, the General Assembly
declared that: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." 3 This Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
concludes, however, with a clear statement against reading the right to
self-determination as a right to secession. "Any attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity
of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations."4 Much more recently the principle of uti
possidetis juris, the principle whereby colonial countries claiming
independence have to accept their preexisting territorial boundaries, has
been declared part of customary international law by the International
Court of Justice in its 1986 decision concerning the frontier dispute
between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali' and its 1992 decision on
the land, island and maritime frontier dispute between El Salvador and
Honduras.6 Although these decisions concerned issues of title to territory
in border disputes, the principle of uti possidetis was affirmed because the
fracturing of preexisting sovereign boundaries was seen as destabilizing the
whole international system.' A system that was, and continues to be, built
on the sanctity of "the territorial integrity . . . [and] political
independence" 8 of sovereign states is unlikely to allow a doctrine to

3.
G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 67, U.N. Doc. AlL. 323
and Add. 1 - 6 (1960).

4. Id.at para. 6.
5. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
6. Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept.
11).
7.

"Its [the principle of uti possidetis juris] obvious purpose is to prevent the

independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by
the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power." Supra note 5,
at para. 20.
8.
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436

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:43 3

develop that undermines part of the bedrock of the theoretical construct,
namely the state with a defined territory, which is one of the traditional
requirements for statehood. 9
The move from a colonial system, which meant that vast numbers
of people were ruled by alien governments, to the achievement of
independent status f6r almost all of the old colonies and protectorates did
not dismantle the state system. Rather it imposed rules on who had rights
to govern. The notion of democracy had begun to take hold as a right
attaching to persons within the framework of the state.
In the
decolonization era the right to self-determination became linked to an
emerging democratic right, but the right is best understood in negative
terms: it was the right not to be governed by foreigners. Professor
Thomas Franck notes that "Self-determination postulates the right of a
people organized in an established territory to determine its collective
political destiny in a democratic fashion and is therefore at the core of the
democratic entitlement."' 0 Whatever the democratic entitlement was, its
initial formulation did not seek to dismantle the state.
V. BEYOND DECOLONIZATION
Once we move beyond the decolonization context, the scope of the
rights encompassed by self-determination becomes unclear, and the
question of the entity to whom the right attaches engenders fierce debate
with, as yet, no resolution.
The introduction of the notion of rights in international law that
attach to human beings as individuals has been one of the more remarkable
1
developments of international law since the end of World War I1."
Although this movement had much earlier political antecedents, as our
own Constitution and Bill of Rights bear witness, it is only in the latter half
of the twentieth century that these human rights have become an accepted
feature of international law.

9. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT THIRD OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 3 201
(1987).
10. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 52 (1992).
11. There was, of course, a much older branch of international law known as
Responsibility of States for Injury to Aliens under which states were obliged to treat aliens within
their borders with a minimum level of due care but this obligation did not traditionally extend to
a state's own citizens.
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VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"
contain an article on self-determination. Article 1 (of both Covenants)
states: "1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development. 2. All peoples may, for their
2

own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. . .

."

The

debate since the introduction of the two Covenants has focused on two
questions: What does the right to self-determination encompass? and who
are the peoples that have this right?
Professor Hurst Hannum has carefully examined a variety of
United Nations materials relating to the meaning of these terms as they
were understood at the time of the drafting of the Covenants. He
concludes that "a careful examination of the legislative history of the
covenants leads to the conclusion that a restrictive interpretation of the
right of self-determination comports with the views of the majority of the
states that supported the right." 14

Self-determination at that time was

understood "'as a right belonging only to colonial peoples, which once it
had been successfully exercised could not be invoked again, and it would
not include a right of secession except for colonies." ' 5 Subsequent
occasional discussion of the scope of the right of self-determination by the
Human Rights Committee has failed to produce any agreement -beyond the
colonial context.'

6

VII. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHT

What is it that the self determines? It has been suggested that the
central right is "to determine . .

.

collective political status through

democratic means"" and this indeed may be a structural necessity for
12. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 at 490) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
13. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) (G.A. Res. 2200, 21 GAOR, Supp. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 52)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
14. Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (1993).
15. Id. quoting the contemporary Director of the U.N. Division of Human Rights John P.
Humphrey, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 129 (1984).
16. E.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/39/40 (1984).
17. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 46, 58 (1992).
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protecting other rights falling within the scope of self-determination, such
as the right to "freely pursue . . economic, social and cultural
development."' 8 Although the United Nations Charter does not impose or
require democratic systems of governance, from a whole host of
subsequent declarations, covenants, and other articulated human rights a
convincing argument can be made that the right to participate in
government is now an established norm of international law.' 9 Indeed the
General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Principles of Law Concerning
Friendly Relations2O links self-determination with the requirement of a
government representing the whole people while at the same time rejecting
the right of secession if the government meets the requirement of
representing the whole people.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
states conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory
2
without distinction as to race, creed or color. '
Three questions naturally present themselves upon reading this
Declaration. What rights do people have if the government does not
represent them? Do they then have a right to secession? What, in fact, is
a representative government for a group that, in some way or another,
perceives itself as dominated by an alien group?
Professor Kirgis reads the language in the Declaration as
indicating:
a right of 'peoples' . . . to secede from an established state
that does not have a fully representative form of
government, or at least to secede from a state whose
government excludes people of any race, creed or color
18.

Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 1, supra note 12. Covenant

of Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, supra note 13.
19.

See generally, FRANK, supra note 17.

20. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the U.N., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 1292

(1970).
21.

Id. at 124, 9 I.L.M. at 1296.
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from political representation when those people are the
ones asserting the right [to self-determination].2
The notion here is that discrimination against certain groups with regard to
eligibility to participate in the political process may legitimatize the claim
to secession. Some writers go beyond participation in the political process
and suggest much broader rights of participation. Professor Nanda writes
of the "right to participate in all value processes-power, wealth and
resources, respect and rectitude, enlightenment and skill, and affection and
well-being," 2 The lower the degree of participation in all of these aspects
of life, the greater the right to secede. The underlying tacit premise of
these lines of argument is that if the subgroup has full access to political
participation or fully participates in all value processes, the claim to
secession is illegitimate. While I do not dispute that the prevalence of
claims for secession reduces where the subgroup does fully participate in
the national life and that the world will be less tolerant of and less
sympathetic towards subgroups with full participatory rights, I do not think
that full participation should be the measure of the legitimacy of
secessionary claims. My principal reason for rejecting full participation of
the subgroup as the litmus test of legitimacy for secession is the argument
based on numbers. If, for example, a particular subgroup who wishes to
secede only make up ten percent of the population, that subgroup will
never find itself living in a nation where its characteristics, however they
may be perceived, are dominant and that is precisely what the subgroup
may wish to achieve by secession. Conversely, where the dominant group
perceives itself as likely to be outnumbered by the dominated group and
likely to have to grant full participatory rights to all governed people it
may well encourage secession, or at least full autonomy. Some writers
have used this latter principle to explain why Israel will, in fact, eventually
recognize a Palestinian state.

VIII. THE SELF OR THE PEOPLE
This takes us directly to the difficult issue of defining the self or
the peoples to whom the right of determination attaches. Certainly it
belongs to the citizens of a state but does it attach to any subgroups?
There is a long trail of lawyerly scholarship that attempts to define groups
which can claim a right of self-determination. Most of these writings

22. Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr., Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the
United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 306 (1994).
23. Ved Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 276 (1981).
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focus on particular characteristics that the group must possess in order to
qualify for the right. Prime contenders in these lists of distinguishing
characteristics are race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language, history,
tradition, and mutual loyalties, though some authors have rejected an
objective criteria test and recommended a psychologicalperceptions test.24
Some writers point out that the group must have ties to a specific area of
25
territory otherwise the claim to recognition as a group is likely to fail.
These writers often conclude that provided the group has at least a certain
minimum combination of these characteristics then the group has a right to
self-determination which might consist of a considerable level of autonomy
from the dominant group or might consist of the right to secession.
Though there have been examples of peaceful secession, for example,
Singapore from the Malaysian Federation, secession is usually achieved in
the wake of armed uprisings which are seen as threatening international
peace and security, thereby undermining the United Nations system. The
unsuccessful attempts by Biafra to secede from Nigeria and Katanga from
the Congo were both accompanied by bloodbaths and were viewed as
major contributors to destabilization. Thus, the resistance to claims of
secession has continued, though less so in fully democratic states than in
more autocratic systems of government.
IX. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CLAIM TO SECESSION
Once a claim to secession has been voiced, the literature shifts to
focus on criteria or methodology for judging the legitimacy of the claim.
Authors have noted the lack of any formal machinery in the international
arena where such claims can be presented and suggestions have been made
to expand and develop some of the existing machinery to permit it to hear
and determine such claims.26
The suggested criteria for judging the legitimacy of a claim to
secession are often related to the deprivation of human rights, particularly
political rights, for the group claiming secession. Professor Kirgis isolates
two key variables in the test for legitimacy of the claim: "the degree of
representative government . . . and the extent of destabilization that the
international community will tolerate ..
."2
He concludes that "a claim
of a right to secede from a representative democracy is not likely to be
24. Id.
25. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 177 (1991).
26. NANDA, supra note 23, at 279-80.
27. Frederick L. Kirgis, Jr. Editorial Comment: The Degrees of Self-Determination in the
United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 308 (1994).
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considered a legitimate exercise of the right of self-determination...
Conversely, a claim to secede from a repressive dictatorship may be
regarded as legitimate." 28 "If a government is quite unrepresentative, the
international community may recognize even a seriously destabilizing selfdetermination claim as legitimate. "29
X. SUMMARY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELFDETERMINATION
What has happened to this right of self-determination? It started
out as a right attaching to dominated nations; it gradually transformed into
a right of citizens within a nation; it then became indissolubly linked with
the right of citizens to participate in governance within a nation; later the
notion of participation was expanded to include full participation in the life
of the nation; then the focus shifted onto the groups that were not
experiencing full political or other forms of participation and selfdetermination was seen as attaching to those groups; and finally selfdetermination has become a declared right for a group to break away from
the nation state and form a new state, at least when full participation (how
ever that is defined) is not guaranteed to the group.
This evolution of self-determination has, to some extent, mirrored
the developments in international law that have moved it from a nation
state focus to a group and individual rights focus.
The demise of
sovereignty, which by now has been so frequently noted as to require little
more than a mention, might be thought to be at odds with the movement
towards ever more claims of sovereignty for ever smaller groups, but I am
not sure that it is. Movements towards regionalism, such as the European
Union, or supra-nationalism, such as the deployment of United Nations
forces, is certainly a reflection of both functional necessity and a
movement towards reducing national divisions, but it is worth noting that
all of these larger-than-state structures operate almost entirely through state
participation. The aspiration of a group within a nation to secede and form
a new nation may be seen as an attempt to achieve greater participatory
rights within the supranational structures, not as a rejection of those
structures.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 310.
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XI. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE RIGHT TO SELFDETERMINATION

The next move that I perceive is that the right to secede will be
recognized as attaching to any self-declared group (provided it has claims
to territory) even though it may have full political and other participatory
rights. For example, the Quebecois, the Scots, the Basques, even the
Northern Italians may be recognized as having legitimate claims to selfdetermination. This type of right is in fact much more likely to be
recognized by fully democratic states, as opposed to dictatorial states,
because democratic states have become accustomed to the notion of ruling
by the consent of the governed. Many social scientists tell us how modem
society fails to support the family and how modern men and women
desperately seek a sense of connectedness. Perhaps smaller units, linked
to larger structures, do provide a better quality of life for their inhabitants.
Recently a student showed me a beautiful map of Europe drawn up in 1992
and neatly divided into seventy five states20 The lines were allegedly
drawn on ethnic and cultural lines. Ancient kingdoms such as Wessex and
Aquitaine were resurrected. I couldn't help wondering if I was looking at
a map of the past or a map of the future.

30.

A.H. HEINEKEN, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (A EUROTOPIA?) (1992).

